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This study presents evidence about the role of emotions in the monetary evaluation of 
health technologies, namely, Drug Eluting Stents (DES) in our case. It is shown that 
subjects who are very afraid of having to undergo an angioplasty are: a) less sensitive to 
the size of the risk reduction provided by DES and b) willing to pay more. The lack of 
scope sensitivity questions the normative validity of the responses of highly emotional 
subjects. We provide evidence of this effect using what we call the Cognitive-Emotional 
Random Utility Model and the responses of a face-to-face, computer assisted personal 






The influence of emotions in human behaviour has attracted an increasing interest in 
economics (Bechara et al., 1997; Diamond and Vartiainen, 2007; Rick and 
Loewenstein, 2008). It has been shown that emotions shape individual preferences in 
consumer behaviour (Ariely, 2009; Lee et al., 2009; Hermalin and Isen, 2008; Shiv and 
Fedorikhin, 1999), investment choices (Chan and Andrade, 2011), economic 
transactions (Shiv et al., 2005; Lerner et al., 2004) and in policy evaluation (Araña and 
León, 2009; Bodenhausen et al., 2000; Bernheim and Rangel, 2007). 
The role of emotions can be particularly important in health technology evaluation, 
since changes in health status are likely to trigger patients’ emotional reactions. 
Emotions such as anxiety or embarrassment have been shown to influence patients’ 
preferences for treatments or screening tests (Elit et al., 1996; Sebban et al., 1995; 
Robbins et al., 2002, Yasunaga et al. 2007; Jonas et al. 2010). Subjects are willing to 
pay substantial amounts of money to avoid injectable drugs and this is explained by 
emotions such as anxiety associated with needles (Matthews et al., 2001; Sadri et al., 
2005). The emotional load of caregivers influence preferences for Alzheimer treatments 
(König et al., 2013; König and Wettstein, 2002; Gervès et al., 2013). Parents’ emotions 
influence their willingness to pay (WTP) for treatments that improve their children’s 
health status (Kuppermann et al., 2000; Liu et al., 2000; Meyerhoff et al., 2001). Araña 
et al. (2008) found that emotional individuals are less prone to take appropriate 
decisions in the context of health care evaluation. Lee et al. (1997) found that fear 
influences patients’ WTP for an autologous blood transfusion, concluding that cost-
effectiveness analysis should include the benefits of avoiding patient’s fear for such a 
measure. In summary, there is evidence emotions influence WTP for a health 
intervention. However, there is no evidence about the potential relationship between 
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emotions and the sensitivity of WTP responses to the magnitude of the benefit provided 
by a health technology. The existence of this sensitivity is crucial if the results of a 
WTP can be used as a guide of social policy, that is, health providers are expected to 
pay more for a new technology as long as it is better than the status quo. If this marginal 
WTP has to be based on the responses of individuals to a survey, subjects have to be 
WTP more for the better technology. This paper presents evidence that emotions reduce 
the sensitivity of WTP values to the size of the benefit provided by a medical 
technology questioning the use of those responses in social policy.  
Evidence that emotions may affect sensitivity to scope was provided for the first time 
by Hsee and Rottenstreich (2004) in a very different context (music CDs). They showed 
that when subjects are in a highly emotional state their WTP hardly changes with the 
amount of the good provided. They argue that high levels of anticipated emotions 
reduce sensitivity to scope because “feelings depend on the nature of a stimulus but not 
on its scope” (p.24). Emotions are driven by the presence or the absence of the stimulus 
and not by the amount of it (scope). The implication of this effect would be that WTP 
values very influenced by emotions would not be good indicators of the social value of 
health technologies. Sensitivity to scope is a desirable property of elicited utility 
functions, and an important requirement by many analysts who use contingent valuation 
results to inform health policy (Carson and Mitchell, 1993; Hausman, 2012). 
Despite the relevance of this research question, there is scarce evidence in the 
economics literature in general, and in the case of medical technologies in particular, 
about the implications of emotions in contingent valuation. This paper explores the role 
of emotions in the monetary valuation of an specific health technology (i.e. DES): will 
emotions produce WTP values for medical treatments sensitive to the magnitude of the 
health benefits associated with different interventions? We provide this evidence using 
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data from a study where subjects were asked their WTP to reduce the risk of restenosis 
(i.e. the risk of needing an operation to implant a stent in their arteries). Different types 
of stents would result in different risk reductions (Baumgart et al., 2007; Chan et al., 
2005; Greenhalgh et al., 2010; Kelbaek et al., 2006; Suttorp et al., 2006) making it 
possible to test the sensitivity of elicited WTP to changes in risk reduction. If the Hsee 
and Rottenstreich (2004) hypothesis is confirmed, the monetary value of stents will 
hardly change with the risk reduction associated with the technology for highly 
emotional subjects. 
It is true that willingness to pay is not the main methodology to evaluate medical 
technologies, however some agencies allow the possibility of using willingness to pay 
studies (Mathes et al 2013). In the specific case of Spain, while Cost-Effectiveness and 
Cost-Utility are the techniques most widely used, willingness to pay studies are also 
allowed if it is understood that they can provide more information about the social value 
of a health technology (Corbacho and Pinto-Prades, 2013). There are also many 
regulations that affect the health of populations that are influenced by willingness to pay 
studies; for example, concepts like the Value of a Statistical Life and non-fatal injuries 
used to evaluate some investments are based on willingness to pay studies. It is highly 
possible that surveys used to estimate willingness to pay for risk reductions in those 
fields are also influenced by emotions.  
The main results of our study are: a) subjects who are more afraid of having an 
angioplasty are WTP more than those who were less afraid; b) subjects who are more 
afraid of having an angioplasty are less sensitive to the amount of benefit (e.g. risk 
reductions) provided by new stents than subjects who are less afraid c) the difference in 
WTP between subjects with high and low fear was mainly concentrated in the smallest 
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level of risk reduction, and was significantly reduced for the highest risk reduction 
level. Therefore, it seems that emotions change the utility function.  
The results have direct implications for the analysis of stated preference methods in 
health economics. In particular, the validity of the monetary values that do not consider 
the emotional dimension is in question as guides for social policy (e.g. the price that the 
health system has to pay for a new and better stent). These results provide empirical 
support in the area of valuation of health technologies of previous findings of lab 
experiments using students and simple objects like music CDs (Hsee and Rottenstreich, 
2004). This is important since it suggests that the role of emotions in the monetary 
valuation of objects can be a general phenomenon present in very different contexts. 
Finally, the role of emotions can also be relevant for other preferences elicitation 
techniques like Time Trade-Off. We believe that our results have interest for a broad 
audience, not only for those interested in the evaluation of one medical technology like 
stents.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the details of the 
fieldwork and the experiment. Section 3 defines the main hypothesis based on the 
random utility model (RUM) (McFadden, 1974). Section 4 presents the results. Finally, 
section 5 discusses some implications of the results, the limitations of the analysis and 




The survey was conducted using a Computer Assisted Personal Interview (CAPI) 
methodology in February-April 2009. The sampling universe was population living in 
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Spain older than 19 years old. The sampling procedure was as follows: primary 
sampling units were 108 municipalities selected from the 17 Spanish regions. 
Municipalities were selected to be representative of seven categories of habitat size: less 
than 2,000; 2,001-10,000; 10,001-50,000; 50,001-100,000; 100,001-400,000; 400,001-
1,000,000, more than 1,000,000 residents. Secondary sampling units were houses 
selected with random routes. In-house selection was according to proportions based on 
gender and age. The survey sample size was 1,663. 
 
The Intervention: The Angioplasty Programme  
The questionnaire was divided into three main sections. In the first section participants 
were informed that the objective of the study was to estimate the value of a health 
technology. The interviewer provided information about causes, symptoms and 
consequences (angina, heart attack) of coronary stenosis. The description was facilitated 
with cards and pictures (Visual Aid). Once the problem was described the survey 
proceeded to explain the medical treatment. It was explained what an angioplasty 
involves and that in most cases a stent is implanted in the occluded artery. Two types of 
stents were described, a Bare-Metal Stent (BMS) and a Drug-Eluting Stent (DES). It 
was explained that BMS were not coated with drugs while DES were. We explained 
that the objective of coating the stent with drugs was to reduce the need of having a new 
angioplasty but that the risk was never zero. 
 
The Evaluation Task 
This section presented the subjects the WTP question. It started with some questions to 
check that respondents understood the benefits of DES over BMS. They were shown 4 
different probabilities of needing a second angioplasty with BMS (e.g. 39%, 34%, 29% 
8 
 
and 24%) and they were asked to compare those probabilities with the probability of 
needing a second angioplasty with a DES. The probability for a DES was kept at 7%. 
They were asked in which of the four cases a DES produced a higher benefit. If they did 
not provide the right answer the system invited them to rectify although their original 
response was recorded.  
The next task was to choose between DES and BMS based only on the health benefit 
(reduction in the risk of restenosis). They were asked: 
Now imagine you feel symptoms like chest pain or shortness of breath and you are 
diagnosed with the kind of heart problem described in the previous section: a coronary 
artery is blocked and you require surgery. The doctor then asks you whether you would 
prefer to have implanted a drug eluting stent or a bare metal stent.  
Individuals who preferred the BMS (in spite of having higher risks) were asked the 
reason for choosing a treatment with higher risks. They were not asked any WTP 
question and they were taken to the sociodemographics section. 
Those who preferred a DES were asked to assume that the national health service only 
funded the BMS and that they had to pay for the DES. They had to choose between a 
stent with higher risk and no cost (BMS) or with lower risk and higher cost (DES). 
They were reminded that the money they were WTP would not be available for other 
purposes. They were also reminded that they could also pay with a loan, gradually over 
time. Then they were asked the following WTP question
1
: 
Assume that the doctor tells you that if you choose a Bare Metal Stent, without extra 
costs for you, you have a 39% probability of requiring further surgery. That is, out of 
100 patients that have the Bare Metal Stent, 39 patients will have to undergo surgery 
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within one or two years because the artery will be blocked again and they will suffer the 
symptoms. The doctor also says that if you choose a Drug Eluting Stent, you have a 7% 
probability of requiring further surgery. That is, out of 100 patients that have the Drug 
Eluting Stent, 7 patients will have to undergo surgery within one or two years. 
However, there are some costs involved for you. Therefore, you have two options: 
 
Would you choose the Drug Eluting Stent if the cost is Y€ or would you rather prefer 
not to pay and have the Bare Metal Stent instead? 
A second question followed, with a higher or lower bid depending on the previous 
response. The second bid was higher than the first if the respondent had accepted the 
bid (bid_up) and it was lower if s/he has rejected it (bid_down). The values of the first 
bid are selected randomly from a set of bids. The bids were tested in a pilot survey 
(n=100) and they were chosen so that the range was wide enough to obtain the true 
WTP curve. Bids are shown in Table 1.  
The evaluation task was repeated three more times with different health benefits. That 
is, each subject was asked 8 WTP dichotomous choice questions corresponding to two 
WTP questions for each of the four risk levels. There were two different versions of the 
questionnaire according to the amounts of benefits presented to participants. In one 
version (the “descending” version), subjects started with a 32% absolute risk reduction 
                                                                                                                                                                          
1
 We present the question for a 39% risk of the BMS. The question was repeated for three other risk 
Option A: a Bare Metal Stent implanted 
 You have a 39% risk of repeated 
revascularization (39 out 100 
patients needs further surgery 
within one or two years) 
 No costs involved 
Option B: a Drug Eluting Stent implanted 
 You have a 7% risk of repeated 
revascularization (7 out 100 patients 
needs further surgery within one or two 
years) 
 You have to pay for it 
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(that is, from 39% to 7%) and then they moved to 27%, 22% and 17%. In the second 
version, (the “ascending” version) subjects started with 2% and they moved to 7%, 12% 
and 17%. These health benefits were selected to reflect the variability of results 
observed in the literature
2
. Patients with risk factors such as complicated lesions or 
diabetes show an average absolute risk reduction in the probability of restenosis of more 
than 30 points if they are implanted a DES instead of a BMS, and for those with 
uncomplicated lesions, the difference between DES and BMS can be as small as 2 
percentual points (Moses et al., 2003; Greenberg et al. 2004). This design makes it 
possible to test the consistency of the results since the same risk reduction (i.e. 17%) is 
presented in two different contexts (ascending and descending). At the end of this 
section the subject was asked: “does the idea of being operated on cause you fear and/or 
anxiety?”. Individuals responded using a Likert scale from 0 (no fear) to 10 (max fear). 
This was the question used to measure the emotional impact of an angioplasty. Finally, 
information was collected on sociodemographic characteristics. 
 
3.  Theoretical Model  
Cognitive Random Utility Model 
In order to be able to estimate patients’ preferences for the health intervention from the 
responses to the contingent valuation study, a utility-based choice model was specified. 
We adopt the representation of the RUM based on McFadden (1974). 
Let us define x = (x1, …, xg) as a composite private good, with x  0, and p = (p1, …, pg) 
a vector of associated prices (p > 0). Let us also consider that the individual has 
                                                                                                                                                                          
levels. 
2
 The degree of risk reduction depends on several characteristics of the patient (e.g. diabetic or not) or 
of the lesion (e.g. diameter of the artery in the occluded part). 
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exogenous income, m  0, socio-demographic characteristics represented by vector s, a 
set of emotional states e = (e1,…, ek), and faces a certain risk of restenosis q. For a well-
behaved preference map (i.e. represented by a strictly increasing, continuous, and 
strictly quasi-concave utility function), utility maximization leads to the following 
indirect utility function: 
 v(p, m, s, e, q) = [max(u(p, m, s, e, q)) : px-m ≤ 0]                                     (1) 
where v is the maximum utility that can be achieved given the individual’s budget 
constraint, socioeconomic status, emotions and the level of health risk she faces. 
Let us consider that qA is the risk associated with a BMS (option A in the choice task). 
If the patient chooses the DES (option B in the choice task), risk will be qB, where qB < 
qA. Therefore, the patient valuation of a DES can be measured as the equivalent 
variation or WTP for such intervention (WTPit). Thus, WTPit can be defined as the 
maximum amount of money that individual i would be willing to pay for the proposed 
intervention at moment t, i.e. the monetary equivalent loss that would leave her 
indifferent between both situations. That is, 
 
𝑣(𝑝, 𝑚, 𝑠, 𝑒, 𝑞𝐴) = 𝑣(𝑝, 𝑚 − 𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑖𝑡, 𝑠, 𝑒, 𝑞𝐵)  (2) 
                    
This formulation is deterministic, since it assumes that the individual knows her utility 
function and can determine her WTP as a function of her socio-economic characteristics 
and the level of risk reduction level (Hanemann, 1984). This restriction can be relaxed 
by assuming that the latent variable WTPit is a function of a random unobservable 
component in addition to the deterministic component of equation (2) (Cameron, 1988). 
Thus, we can write the WTP of individual i at moment t for the health intervention as, 
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                      (3a) 
where it is a random error term, which is assumed normally distributed with zero mean 
and  standard error,   X'itγ   is the linear predictor associated with a regression 
parameter vector   and a covariate vector Xit including (p, m, s), ei the emotional state 
corresponding to individual i, and  HRRit denotes the health risk reduction, that is, qA-
qB. 
 
Cognitive-Emotional Random Utility Model 
A more general specification of the RUM needs to be specified in order to test the role 
of emotions in the monetary value of stents. In order to do so, we need to extend the 
standard algebraical representation of the RUM in the context of emotional choices. 
Based on the existing evidence on the impact of emotions on individual decision-
making problems (Hsee and Rottenstreich, 2004) and previous efforts aimed at 
modelling the role of emotions in RUM environments (Araña and León, 2008; León et 
al., 2014), we propose below  an extension.  
 
 
Emotional Shift Effect on Patient’s Valuation 
The emotional variable (ei) is operationalized as a dichotomous variable (HEi, high 
emotions) taking value 1 if the anticipated emotional level is high, and 0 otherwise. 
Thus, the anticipated emotional level of the intervention directly affects the WTP for 
such intervention, that is, the higher the fear for the intervention the higher the WTP for 
reducing the risks (assuming > 0). We can call this effect an “emotional shift effect” 




in the utility function, and can be included as an extra term in the deterministic part of 
the WTP weighted by a parameter α.That is,  
 (3b) 
 
Scope Sensitivity Effect on Patient’s Valuation 
Hsee and Rottenstreich (2004) claim that individuals experiencing high levels of 
anticipated emotion will not only value the outcome differently, but also emotions will 
affect how they value changes in the quality of the good under valuation. In other 
words, the valuation of any improvement in the intervention (e.g. health risk reduction) 
will also be completely different among subjects’ experiencing high and low level of 
emotions. More emotional subjects will be less sensitive to the size of the benefit. This 
hypothesis can be called the “emotional scope sensitivity effect” and can be included in 
equation (3b) by allowing the parameter vector for subjects experiencing low level of 
emotions  to be significantly different from that one of highly emotional patients 
. 
More specifically we expect β* < 0. That is, we expect people who are highly 
emotional to be less sensitive to the magnitude of the health gain.  
Therefore, an alternative expression of equation (3a) that would make it possible to test 
both hypotheses (shift and emotional scope sensitivity effects) would be,  
itiitLEitiitit HEHRRHRRHEXWTP   *
'   (3c)             
Shift effects would be estimated using the parameter  and scope sensitivity using β*. 
The predictions are that  and 𝛽∗ < 0. 







4. The Econometric Model  
Since each individual provided eight responses (two WTP questions for each health 
benefit, and four different health benefits), they could be correlated. The random effects 
probit model allows these responses to be freely correlated by assuming that the error 
term of the latent variable WTP (εit) is the sum of an unobservable characteristic 
specific to individual i (wi) and a random error term (vit) that varies across individuals 
and responses (Haab, 1997), where t indexes the number of responses per individual. 
Both wi and vit follow a normal distribution with a mean of zero and a standard deviation 
of σw and σv, respectively. 
The random disturbance wi is assumed to be uncorrelated with the other regressors and 
since it only varies with the individual and remains constant over the individual’s 
responses, it introduces correlation between responses of the same individual according 
to the expression:  





where t and s stand for two different responses of individual i.   
The probability of a “yes” response, conditional on wi, is:   
𝑃 𝑟(𝑦𝑒𝑠) = 𝑃 𝑟(𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑖𝑡 ≥ 𝑏𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡)  
= 𝑃 𝑟 ( + 𝑤𝑖 + 𝑣 𝑖𝑡 ≥ 𝑏𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡)  
= 𝑃𝑟 (






*'  iitLEitiit HEHRRHRRHEX 




+  𝑤𝑖 − 𝑏𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡
𝜎𝑣
) =  Φit  
where Φ is the standard normal cumulative density function. The unconditional sample 
log-likelihood function is obtained by considering all the responses and removing the 
conditioning on wi:  





where yit is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the t response of the individual 
i is yes, 0 otherwise; and g(.) is the normal density function of the wi.   
From these parameters, the mean WTP is computed by using the average of the 
explanatory variables. In order to make fair comparisons between WTP estimates, these 
averages have been computed considering the whole sample.  
 
5. Results 
Sample population is representative of the Spanish population; socioeconomic 
characteristics of sample and Spanish populations are shown in Table 2. Final sample 
size was 1,479 distributed in the ascending version (n=716) and in the descending 
version (n=763) of the questionnaire. There were 149 individuals that preferred the 
BMS over the DES. The most common cause to reject a DES was fear of the drug that it 
contains. Observations of 35 individuals that did not provide information on age, 
employment status or answered “N/A” to a bid were excluded from the analysis. 
In order to study the effect of emotions, individuals were classified as having high 
emotions (i.e. HE=1) when their declared level of anxiety and fear was above the 
median in the Likert scale (i.e. 8, 9 and 10) (n=729), and as LE when the score was 7 or 
less (n=750). In this way the two subsamples were of similar size (n=729 for HE and 
*'  iitLEitiit HEHRRHRRHEX 
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n=750 for LE). The use of the median guarantees enough statistical power to test the 
proposed hypotheses by using an even distribution of respondents in the high and low 
emotions group (King and Zeng, 2001).  
To control for differences in the composition of the sub-samples, a number of covariates 
were included in the WTP function: age (number of years), gender (male/female), 
education (years of study) and employment status (employed/unemployed). The 
distribution of the covariates age, education and labour status in the four groups is rather 
similar (see Table 3) but this is not the case for gender. HE groups show a higher 
presence of female respondents (58 percent), than LE groups (41-44 percent). 
Parameter estimates and mean WTP estimates for four different models applied to the 
ascending and descending groups are shown in Tables 4 and 5, respectively.  Model 1 is 
the base model, where the HE and LE groups are pooled together with no distinction 
and including the HRR as a continuous variable. Model 2 includes the emotional shift 
and scope sensitivity effects (variables HE and HRRxHE, respectively). Model 3 
includes the HRR by means of the dummy variables HRRRR, where RR stands for the 
risk reduction (HRR7, HRR12, HRR17 in the ascending group, and HRR27, HRR22 and 
HRR17 in the descending group) rather than one continuous variable as done in Model 
1, which allows more flexibility in the WTP estimates for each health benefit. Finally, 
Model 4 uses dummy variables for each level of risk reduction similarly to Model 3, but 
making a distinction between the HE and the LE groups (LERR and HERR dummy 
variables). 
As can be seen in Tables 4 and 5, the portion of the model variance accounted for by 
individual variation is significant at the 1% level, indicating that the responses from the 
first to the eighth question are correlated. This supports the use of a REM econometric 




Emotional Shift Effect on Patients’ Preferences 
Results obtained show the existence of an emotional shift. The coefficients associated to 
the HE variable in model 2 are positive and highly significant, leading to higher WTP 
estimates for the HE groups in the ascending and descending versions (Tables 4 and 5). 
This result is not surprising at all since it could be expected that those subjects who are 
more afraid of the intervention are also WTP more. However, the result is relevant for 
our research since it shows that the question we used to measure feelings is actually 
discriminating between subjects according to this characteristic, namely, level of fear. 
Similar conclusions are obtained from Models 3 and 4. In these models, the effect of the 
magnitude of the health benefit on WTP is not constrained to be linear, since dummy 
variables are used for each level. A likelihood ratio test between Models 3 and 4 finds 
that there are significant differences on WTP between the HE group and the LE groups 
for the different levels of health benefit jointly considered (the test statistics are 32.19 
and 21.72 in the ascending and descending versions respectively, whereas the 1% 
critical value for the chi-squared distribution with 4 degrees of freedom is 13.28).  
Moreover, from Model 4, several likelihood ratio tests were carried out to test, for each 
level of risk reduction and sequence, the equality of coefficients between the HERR and 
the LERR dummy variables. In all these tests, the null hypothesis of equality is rejected 
at the 1% significance level (1% critical value for the chi-squared distribution with 1 
degree of freedom is 6.63). This point, together with the fact the coefficient estimates of 
the HERR dummy variables are always higher than their LE counterpart, confirms the 




Scope Sensitivity Effect on Patient’s Valuation 
The results show that WTP estimates increase with the amount of risk reduction (e.g. 
health benefit). The associated parameter to HRR is significant and positive in Models 1 
and 2. Similar conclusions are obtained when using dummy variables (Models 3 and 4).  
However, sensitivity to scope is sensibly higher for the LE group. The presence of 
scope effect is tested with the parameter (*) associated to the interaction HExHRR. 
For both the ascending and the descending sequences, * are significant at the 5% level 
and negative, indicating that the slope of the HE group is lower than the slope of the LE 
group. This effect is more evident for the ascending sequence since in this case the 
coefficient of the interaction HExHRR is more strongly negative and more significant 
(Tables 4 and 5).  
Similar conclusions are drawn looking at the WTP estimates obtained with Model 4 
(Tables 4 and 5). In the “ascending” version, the WTP estimates for the HE group go 
from 7,615.86€ to 10,526.95€, whereas in the LE group go from 2,597.67€ to 
7,953.33€, almost doubling the HE increase. In the descending version, the WTP 
estimates go from 13,108.86€ to 12,096.22€ for the HE group and from 9,365.39€ to 
7,178.24€ for the LE group, being again this difference higher for the LE group (more 
than doubling in this case).  
Finally, the existence of differences for the 17% risk reduction in the “ascending” and 
descending versions was tested. This was done by putting together both versions for 
each level of fear (HE and LE groups). This way all the dummy variables for each risk 
reduction in the HE group (HERR, RR=2, 7, 12, 17, 22, 27, 32) were estimated 
simultaneously, making a distinction between HE17 from the ascending version 
(HE17Asc) and from the descending version (HE17Desc), same for the LE group. Next, 
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these two models were re-estimated constraining these two dummies to be equal 
(HE17Asc= HE17Desc in the HE model, and LE17Asc= LE17Desc in the LE model). Two 
likelihood ratios test were computed between the constrained and unconstrained models, 
concluding that estimates for a 17% risk reduction in the ascending and descending 
versions for each level of fear are not statistically different at the 1% significance level 
(the test statistics are 1.682 and 0.842 while the 1% critical value for the chi-squared 
distribution with 1 degrees of freedom is 6.63).  
 
 6. Discussion and Concluding Remarks 
The paper shows that emotions can influence the monetary value of health technologies 
(in this case DES)
3
. Choosing between health technologies is a highly emotional issue 
and it is not surprising that the evaluation of such technologies is influenced by 
emotions. The first lesson of this paper is that researchers should try to measure the 
impact of emotions in the evaluation of such health technologies. This is especially 
important given that highly emotional subjects not only are WTP more for a reduction 
in the risk of restenosis (this is perfectly reasonable) but they are not very sensitive to 
the magnitude of the risk reduction. This seems to confirm Hsee and Rottenstreich 
(2004) hypothesis that responses to WTP questions mainly reflect the ‘nature’ of the 
good (e.g. reduction in the risk of restenosis) and not so much the magnitude of the 
effect (size of the risk reduction) when emotions are high.  
This result has implications for the use of WTP as guidance for public health policy. 
Assume, for example, that we want to estimate how much a National Health System has 
to pay for new stents. The main reason that the health system is WTP a higher price for 
20 
 
new stents is that they produce better outcomes, namely, lower number of restenosis. If 
we want to use contingent valuation to estimate social WTP, subjects have to be 
sensitive to the magnitude of the benefit. However, we have seen that, when emotions 
are high WTP estimates hardly change with the amount of the benefit.  
This result questions the normative status of highly emotional responses for social 
policy. Can we use WTP estimates that do not make any distinction between a 2% and a 
7% risk reduction? Can we use WTP estimates that reflect a WTP for a 32% risk 
reduction that is only 8% higher than the WTP for a 17% risk reduction? We think that 
the response should be negative, that is, emotions should be considered a bias to be 
corrected. This also opens the issue of the role of emotions in methods like the Time 
Trade-Off or Standard Gamble. It is not uncommon that subjects provide the same 
utility for health states that have different severity level. For example, in the case of 
very bad health states (the so-called worse than death health states) it is quite common 
for subject to provide the lowest possible utility (e.g. -39 in the former Euroqol 
protocol). Dolan and Kahneman (2008) suggest that those evaluations are highly 
influenced by the fear generated by the description of the health problem, so it is 
possible that the finding that subjects collapse the utility of bad health states (that are 
actually different) to the lowest possible utility is because all those health states 
generate the same negative emotions. 
We share the Slovic approach (Slovic, 2007) in order to deal with feelings and 
emotions. Slovic (2007) suggests that people are insensitive to the number of victims in 
the case of mass murder or genocides because the emotional impact is the same for very 
different absolute number of victims. In that case, the amount of resources devoted to 
                                                                                                                                                                          
3
 Similar conclusions in relation to our hypothesis were drawn when using only the response to the first 
dichotomous choice question for each of the four risk reduction levels. These results are available from 
the authors upon request. 
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prevent mass murder cannot be driven by the emotional reaction to the number of 
victims since it is highly insensitive to scope. In the same way, the price of a stent has to 
reflect the magnitude of the risk reduction. For this reason, researchers should try to 
incorporate questions to pick up the effect of emotions in WTP studies of health 
treatments. They can be used as a debiasing tool or simply as a personality trait that 
helps to improve our understanding of the responses. If we observe that subjects are not 
sensitive to scope because they are in a highly emotional state those responses should 
not be taken into consideration in the case of a public authority that wants to use the 
results of those studies in order to reimburse the firm that has developed the better stent. 
We understand that this is a very personal approach about the role of emotion. 
However, whatever our normative approach to the role of emotions this seems to be a 
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Table 1. Offered bids for each sample (in euros) 


























Table 2 Socioeconomic characteristics. Survey and Spanish populations 






2 0 -3 4  29.5 28.3 
3 5 -4 9  28.3 29.9 
5 0 -6 4  22.5 21.5 
6 5 +  19.6 20.3 
Gen d er
2  
   
(
%  f ema le )  50.7 50.6 
Lev e l  o f  s t u d i e s
3
 
Co mp u l so r y  ed u ca t io n  37.9 23.1 
1 s t  l ev e l  S eco n d a r y  34.5 27.5 
2 n d  l e ve l  S eco n d a r y  8.3 21.0 
Hig h e r  Ed u ca t io n  19.2 28.5 
E mp lo y me n t
4
 
Emp lo ye d  59.9 60.1 
Un e mp lo yed  40.1 39.8 
HH a v e ra g e  s i z e
5  
  
Nu mb e r  o f  i n d iv id u a l s  3.1 2.9 
Net  HH i nco me
6  
  
Up  to  1 ,2 0 0 €  39.6 45 
Fro m 1 , 2 0 1  to  3 ,0 0 0 €  55.3 51.2 
Mo re  th a n  3 ,0 0 0 €  5.1 3.8 
1 ,2   Estimations from Census, January 2009. (Padrón Municipal) 
3  Data from the Ministry of Education (Sistema Estatal de Indicadores en Educación) 
http://www.institutodeevaluacion.mec.es/contenidos/pdfs/c4_2007.pdf 
4 Employment Survey. (Encuesta de Población Activa) First Quarter  2009. 
5 Household Budget Survey,(Encuesta de Presupuestos Familiares), 2005. 
6 Income Survey (Encuesta de Estructura Salarial), 2006. 















Age (average) 45.4 46.5 48.3 47.7 
Gender (% female) 44.4 41.1 58.9 58.5 
Years of study (average) 9.7 9.7 9.2 9.6 
Laboral Status (% employed) 58.1 61.7 59.2 61.8 
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Table 4. Parameters estimates. Ascending Sequence 
 
Covariates Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 Parameter p-value Parameter p-value Parameter p-value Parameter p-value 
Constant .1079 .8030 -.3312 .4484 .1712 .6930 -.2678 .5410 
Bid -.1985 .0000 -.1994 .0000 -.1983 .0000 -.1995 .0000 
Age .0040 .4593 .0016 .7595 .0040 .4564 .0016 .7657 
Gender -.1749 .3058 -.0716 .6738 -.1741 .3087 -.0707 .6784 
Laboral 
status 
.4526 .0205 .3780 .0555 .4562 .0197 .3802 .0547 
Education .0500 .0304 .0540 .0199 .0500 .0308 .0539 .0205 
HRR .0561 .0000 .0708 .0000 - - - 
- 
HE   .9957 .0000 - - - - 
HRRxHE   -.0288 .0000 - - - - 
HRR7     .3539 .0000   
HRR12     .6970 .0000   
HRR17     .8182 .0000   
LE7       .5206 .0000 
LE12       .8579 .0000 
LE17       1.0685 .0000 
HE2       1.0011 .0000 
HE7       1.2028 .0000 
HE12       1.5544 .0000 
HE17       1.5819 .0000 
 .8043 .0000 .7996 .0000 .8046 .0000 .8001 .0000 
LnL -2,558.450 -2,543.546 -2,555.111 -2,539.017 
WTP estimates 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
  HE LE  HE LE 
2 5,417.64 7,698.85 2,997.11 5,192.58 7,615.86 2,597.67 
7 6,832.18 8,751.30 4,773.14 6,976.52 8,626.41 5,207.44 
12 8,246.72 9,803.75 6,549.17 8,706.14 10,388.71 6,897.82 




Table 5. Parameters estimates. Descending Sequence 
Covariates Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 Parameter p-value Parameter p-value Parameter p-value Parameter p-value 
Constant .3781 .5204 -.8332 .1507 1.3282 .0236 .3700 .5166 
Bid -.2472 .0000 -.2484 .0000 -.2473 .0000 -.2484 .0000 
Age .0035 .6379 .0097 .1910 .0033 .6556 .0097 .1909 
Gender -.0543 .8028 .2860 .2037 -.0564 .7956 .2866 .2033 
Laboral 
status 
.5290 .0371 .6337 .0112 .5272 .0378 .6317 .0115 
Education .0996 .0005 .1018 .0004 .0992 .0005 .1019 .0004 
HRR .0279 .0000 .0364 .0000     
HE   1.5451 .0000     
HRRxHE   -.0193 .0196     
HRR27     -.2175 .0064   
HRR22     -.3673 .0000   
HRR17     -.4180 .0000   
LE27       -.2530 .0142 
LE22       -.4548 .0000 
LE17       -.5434 .0000 
HE32       .9301 .0001 
HE27       .7585 .0018 
HE22       .6733 .0057 
HE17       .6718 .0050 
 .8967 .0000 .8904 .0000 .8969 .0000 .8905 .0000 
LnL -2,355.989 -2,345.139 -2354.755 -2343.895 
WTP estimates 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
  HE LE  HE LE 
32 10,861.05 12,936.49 9,213.35 11,028.82 13,108.86 9,365.39 
27 10,296.56 12,592.59 8,479.33 10,149.20 12,418.35 8,347.08 
22 9,732.07 12,248.69 7,745.30 9,543.68 12,075.45 7,534.81 
17 9,167.57 11,904.78 7,011.27 9,338.45 12,069.22 7,178.24 
 
 

